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Abstract—A Self modifying code is code that modifies its
own instructions during execution time. It is nowadays widely
used, especially in malware to make the code hard to analyse
and to detect by anti-viruses. Thus, the analysis of such self
modifying programs is a big challenge. Pushdown systems (PDSs)
is a natural model that is extensively used for the analysis of
sequential programs because they allow to accurately model
procedure calls and mimic the program’s stack. In this work,
we propose to extend the PushDown System model with self-
modifying rules. We call the new model Self-Modifying Push-
Down System (SM-PDS). A SM-PDS is a PDS that can modify
its own set of transitions during execution. We show how SM-
PDSs can be used to naturally represent self-modifying programs
and provide efficient algorithms to compute the backward and
forward reachable configurations of SM-PDSs. We implemented
our techniques in a tool and obtained encouraging results. In
particular, we successfully applied our tool for the detection of
self-modifying malware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-modifying code is code that modifies its own instruc-
tions during execution time. It is nowadays widely used,
mainly to make programs hard to understand. For example,
self-modifying code is extensively used to protect software
intellectual property, since it makes reverse code engineering
harder. It is also abundantly used by malware writers in order
to obfuscate their malicious code and make it hard to analyse
by static analysers and anti-viruses.
There are several kinds of implementations for self-
modifying codes. Packing [CT08] consists in applying com-
pression techniques to make the size of the executable file
smaller. This converts the executable file to a form where the
executable content is hidden. Then, the code is ”unpacked” at
runtime before execution. Such packed code is self-modifying.
Encryption is another technique to hide the code. It uses some
kind of invertible operations to hide the executable code with
an encryption key. Then, the code is ”decrypted” at runtime
prior to execution. Encrypted programs are self-modifying.
These two forms of self-modifying codes have been well
studied in the litterature and could be handled by several
unpacking tools such as [Tea], [Kar].
In this work, we consider another kind of self-modifying
code, caused by self-modifying instructions, where code is
treated as data that can thus be read and written by self-
modifying instructions. These self-modifying instructions are
usually mov instructions, since mov can access memory, and
read and write to it. For example, consider the program
shown in Fig.1. For simplification matters, we suppose that
the addresses’ length is 1 byte. The binary code is given in
the left side, while in the right side, we give its corresponding
assembly code obtained by translating syntactically the binary
code at each address. For example, ff is the binary code
of the instruction push, thus, the first line is translated to
push 0x3, the second line to push 0b, etc. Let us execute
this code. First, we execute push 0x3, then push 0b, then
mov 0x2 0xc. This last instruction will replace the first byte
at address 0x2 by 0xc. Thus, at address 0x2, ff 0b is
replaced by 0c 0b. Since 0c is the binary code of jmp, this
means the instruction push 0b is replaced by jmp 0xb.
Therefore, this code is self-modifying. If we treat it blindly,
without looking at the semantics of the different instructions,
we will extract from it the Control Flow Graph CFG a,
whereas its correct Control Flow Graph is CFG b. You can see
that the mov instruction was able to modify the instructions
of the program successfully via its ability to read and write
the memory.
In this paper, we consider the reachability analysis of self-
modifying programs where the code is modified by mov
instructions. To this aim, we first need to find an adequate
model for such programs. PushDown Systems (PDS) are
known to be a natural model for sequential programs [Sch02],
as they allow to track the contexts of the different calls in
the program. Moreover, PushDown Systems allow to record
and mimic the program’s stack, which is very important for
malware detection. Indeed, to check whether a program is
malicious, anti-viruses start by identifying the calls it makes
to the API functions. To evade these checks, malware writers
try to obfuscate the calls they make to the Operating System
by using pushes and jumps. Thus, it is important to be able
to track the stack to detect such obfuscated calls. This is
why PushDown Systems were used in [ST12], [ST13] to
model binary programs in order to perform malware detection.
However, these works do not consider malwares that use self-
modifying code, as PushDown Systems are not able to model
self-modifying instructions.
To overcome this limitation, we propose in this work to
extend the PushDown System model with self-modifying
rules. We call the new model Self-Modifying PushDown
System (SM-PDS). Roughly speaking, a SM-PDS is a PDS
that can modify its own set of transitions during execution. We
show how SM-PDSs can be used to naturally represent self-
modifying programs. It turns out that SM-PDSs are equivalent
to standard PDSs. We show how to translate a SM-PDS
to a standard PDS. This translation is exponential. Thus,
performing the reachability analysis on the equivalent PDS is
not efficient. We propose then direct algorithms to compute
the forward (post∗) and backward (pre∗) reachability sets
for SM-PDSs. This allows to efficiently perform reachability
analysis for self-modifying programs. Our algorithms are
based on (1) representing regular (potentially infinite) sets of
configurations of SM-PDSs using finite state automata, and
(2) applying saturation procedures on the finite state automata
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0x0 push 0x3
0x2 push 0b
0x4 mov 0x2 0xc
0x7 push %ebx
0x9 jmp 0x2
0x0 push 0x3
0x2 jmp 0b
0x4 mov 0x2 0xc
0x9 jmp 0x2
0xb dec %ebx
CFG a CFG b
0xb  dec  %ebx
CFGs
0x7 push %ebx
0x0      push 0x3
0x2      push 0b
0x4     mov 0x2 0xc
0x7     push %ebx
0x9    jmp 0x2
0xb    dec  %ebx
 ff 03
 ff 0b
c6 02 0c
 ff 01
0c 02
48 01
Binary Codes Assemblyaddress
Codes
0x2 push 0b
0x2   jmp 0b
After Execution of 
mov 0x2 0xc
Fig. 1: A Simple Example of Self-modifying Codes
in order to take into account the effect of applying the rules
of the SM-PDS. We implemented our algorithms in a tool
that takes as input either an SM-PDS or a self-modifying
program. Our experiments show that our direct techniques
are much more efficient than translating the SM-PDS to an
equivalent PDS and then applying the standard reachability
algorithms for PDSs [BEM97], [EHRS00], [Sch02]. Moreover,
we successfully applied our tool to the analysis of several self-
modifying malwares.
This paper is an expanded version of the conference
paper [TY17]. Compared to [TY17], in this expanded
version, we propose new algorithms for computing the
forward and backward reachable configurations for SM-
PDSs, and we provide the detailed proofs that show the
correctness of our constructions.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 introduces our new model and shows how to
translate a SM-PDS to an equivalent pushdown system. In
Section 3, we give the translation from a binary code to a
SM-PDS. In Section 4, we define finite automata to represent
regular (potentially infinite) sets of configurations of SM-
PDSs. Sections 5 and 6 give our algorithms to compute the
backward and forward reachability sets of SM-PDSs. Section
7 describes our experiments.
Related Work.
Reachability analysis of pushdown systems was considered
in [BEM97], [EHRS00]. Our algorithms are extensions of the
saturation approach of these works.
Model checking and static analysis approaches have been
widely used to analyze binary programs, for instance,
in [BDD+01], [BRK+05], [SL03], [CJS+05], [KKSV05],
[ST13], [CJS+05]. These works cannot handle self-modifying
code.
Cai et al. [CSV07] use a Hoare-logic-style framework to
describe self-modifying code by applying local reasoning and
separation logic, and treating program code uniformly as
regular data structure. However, [CSV07] requires programs to
be manually annotated with invariants. In [CT08], the authors
describe a formal semantics for self-modifying codes, and use
that semantics to represent self-unpacking code. This work
only deals with packing and unpacking behaviours, it cannot
capture self-modifying instructions as we do. In [BMRP09],
Bonfante et al. provide an operational semantics for self-
modifying programs and show that they can be constructively
rewritten to a non-modifying program. All these specifications
[BMRP09], [CSV07], [CT08] are too abstract to be used in
practice.
In [AMDB06], the authors propose a new representation
of self-modifying code named State Enhanced-Control Flow
Graph (SE-CFG). SE-CFG extends standard control flow
graphs with a new data structure, keeping track of the pos-
sible states programs can reach, and with edges that can be
conditional on the state of the target memory location. It is
not easy to analyse a binary program only using its SE-CFG,
especially that this representation does not allow to take into
account the stack of the program.
[BLP16] propose abstract interpretation techniques to com-
pute an over-approximation of the set of reachable states of a
self-modifying program, where for each control point of the
program, an over-approximation of the memory state at this
control point is provided. [RM10] combine static and dynamic
analysis techniques to analyse self-modifying programs. Un-
like our self-modifying pushdown systems, these techniques
[BLP16], [RM10] cannot handle the program’s stack.
Finally, unpacking binary code is considered in [CDKT09],
[KPY07], [RHD+06], [CT08]. These works do not consider
self-modifying mov instructions.
II. SELF-MODIFYING PUSHDOWN SYSTEMS
A. Definition
We introduce in this section our new model: Self-modifying
Pushdown Systems.
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Definition 1. A Self-modifying Pushdown System (SM-PDS)
is a tuple P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c), where P is a finite set of control
points, Γ is a finite set of stack symbols, ∆ ⊆ (P ×Γ)× (P ×
Γ∗) is a finite set of transition rules, and ∆c ⊆ P×(∆∪∆c)×
(∆ ∪∆c) × P is a finite set of modifying transition rules. If
((p, γ), (p′, w)) ∈ ∆, we also write 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆.
If (p, r1, r2, p′) ∈ ∆c, we also write p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c. A
Pushdown System (PDS) is a SM-PDS where ∆c = ∅.
Intuitively, a Self-modifying Pushdown System is a Push-
down System that can dynamically modify its set of rules
during the execution time: rules ∆ are standard PDS transition
rules, while rules ∆c modify the current set of transition rules:
〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆ expresses that if the SM-PDS is in
control point p and has γ on top of its stack, then it can
move to control point p′, pop γ and push w onto the stack,
while p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c expresses that when the PDS is in
control point p, then it can move to control point p′, remove
the rule r1 from its current set of transition rules, and add
the rule r2. Formally, a configuration of a SM-PDS is a tuple
c = (〈p, w〉, θ) where p ∈ P is the control point, w ∈ Γ∗ is the
stack content, and θ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c is the current set of transition
rules of the SM-PDS. θ is called the current phase of the
SM-PDS. When the SM-PDS is a PDS, i.e., when ∆c = ∅,
a configuration is a tuple c = (〈p, w〉,∆), since there is no
changing rule, so there is only one possible phase. In this case,
we can also write c = 〈p, w〉. Let C be the set of configurations
of a SM-PDS. A SM-PDS defines a transition relation ⇒P
between configurations as follows: Let c = (〈p, w〉, θ) be a
configuration, and let r be a rule in θ, then:
1) if r ∈ ∆c is of the form r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′, such that
r1 ∈ θ, then (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w〉, θ′), where θ′ =
(θ \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}. In other words, the transition rule r
updates the current set of transition rules θ by removing
r1 from it and adding r2 to it.
2) if r ∈ ∆ is of the form r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w′〉 ∈ ∆,
then (〈p, γw〉, θ)⇒P (〈p′, w′w〉, θ). In other words, the
transition rule r moves the control point from p to p′,
pops γ from the stack and pushes w′ onto the stack.
This transition keeps the current set of transition rules
θ unchanged.
Let ⇒∗P be the transitive, reflexive closure of ⇒P . We
define i⇒ as follows: c i⇒ c′ iff there exists a sequence of
configurations c0 ⇒P c1 ⇒P ...⇒P ci s.t. c0 = c and ci = c
Given a configuration c, the set of immediate predecessors
(resp. successors) of c is preP(c) = {c′ ∈ C : c′ ⇒P c}
(resp. postP(c) = {c′ ∈ C : c ⇒P c′}). These notations
can be generalized straightforwardly to sets of configurations.
Let pre∗P (resp. post
∗
P ) denote the reflexive-transitive closure
of preP (resp. postP ). We omit the subscript P when it is
understood from the context.
Example 1. Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS where
p = {p1, p2, p3, p4}, Γ = {γ1, γ2, γ3}, ∆ = {r1 :
〈p1, γ1〉 ↪→ 〈p2, γ2γ1〉, r2 : 〈p2, γ2〉 ↪→ 〈p3, 〉, r3 : 〈p4, γ1〉 ↪→
〈p2, γ2γ3〉}, ∆c = {r′ : p3
(r1,r3)
↪−−−−→ p4}. Let c0 =
(〈p1, γ1γ1〉, θ0) where θ0 = {r1, r2, r′}. Applying rule r1,
we get (〈p1, γ1γ1〉, θ0)⇒P (〈p2, γ2γ1γ1〉, θ0). Then, applying
rule r2, we get (〈p2, γ2γ1γ1〉, θ0) ⇒P (〈p3, γ1γ1〉, θ0). Then,
applying rule r′, we get (〈p3, γ1γ1〉, θ0) ⇒P (〈p4, γ1γ1〉, θ1)
where r′ is self-modifying, thus, it leads the SM-PDS from
phase θ0 = {r1, r2, r′} to phase θ1 = θ0 \ {r1} ∪
{r3} = {r2, r3, r′}. Then, applying rule r3, we get
(〈p4, γ1γ1〉, θ1) ⇒P (〈p2, γ2γ3γ1〉, θ1). Then, applying rule
r2 again, we get (〈p2, γ2γ3γ1〉, θ1)⇒P (〈p3, γ3γ1〉, θ1).
B. From SM-PDSs to PDSs
A SM-PDS can be described by a PDS. This is due to the
fact that the number of phases is finite, thus, we can encode
phases in the control points of the PDS: Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c)
be a SM-PDS, we compute the PDS P ′ = (P ′,Γ,∆′) as
follows: P ′ = P × 2∆∪∆c . Initially, ∆′ = ∅. For every
θ ∈ 2∆∪∆c , r ∈ θ:
1) If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ (p′, w) ∈ ∆, we add 〈(p, θ), γ〉 ↪→
〈(p′, θ), w〉 to ∆′
2) if r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c, then for every γ ∈ Γ,
we add 〈(p, θ), γ〉 ↪→ 〈(p′, θ′), γ〉 to ∆′, where θ′ =
(θ \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}.
It is easy to see that:
Proposition 1. (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′) iff
〈(p, θ), w〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ′), w′〉.
Proof:
⇒: We will show that if (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′), then
we have 〈(p, θ), w〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ′), w′〉. There are two cases
depending on the form of the rule that led to this transition.
• Case θ = θ′ : it means that the transition does not
correspond to a self-modifying transition rule. Thus there
is a rule r ∈ θ of the form r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, u′〉
that led to this transition. Let u be such that w =
γu,w′ = u′u. By the construction rule of the PDS P ′,
we have 〈(p, θ), γ〉 ↪→ 〈(p′, θ), u′〉 ∈ ∆′. Therefore,
〈(p, θ), γu〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ), u′u〉 holds. This implies that
〈(p, θ), w〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ), w′〉.
• Case θ 6= θ′ : it means that the transition corresponds
to a self-modifying transition rule. Thus there is a rule
r ∈ θ of the form p (r1,r2)↪−−−−→ p′ that led to this
transition. Let u be such that w = γu,w′ = γu. By the
construction rule of the PDS P ′, we have 〈(p, θ), γ〉 ↪→
〈(p′, θ′), γ〉 ∈ ∆′ where θ′ = (θ\{r1})∪{r2}. Therefore,
〈(p, θ), γu〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ′), γu〉 holds. This implies that
〈(p, θ), w〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ′), w′〉.
⇐: We will show that if 〈(p, θ), w〉 ⇒P′ 〈(p′, θ′), w′〉, then
(〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′). Let γ ∈ Γ, u, u′ ∈ Γ∗ be such
that w = γu,w′ = u′u. There are two cases.
• Case θ = θ′. Let r = 〈(p, θ), γ〉 ↪→ 〈(p′, θ), u′〉 ∈ ∆′ be
the rule that led to the transition. By the construction
of PDS P ′, there must exist a rule r ∈ θ such that
r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, u′〉. Therefore, (〈p, γu〉, θ) ⇒P
(〈p, u′u〉, θ) holds. This implies that (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P
(〈p, w′〉, θ′).
• Case θ 6= θ′. Let r = 〈(p, θ), γ〉 ↪→ 〈(p′, θ′), γ〉 ∈ ∆′
be the rule leading to the transition and u′ = γ. By the
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construction of PDS P ′, there must exist a rule r ∈ θ
such that r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ where θ′ = (θ\{r1})∪{r2}.
Therefore, (〈p, γu〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, γu〉, θ′) holds. This
implies that (〈p, w〉, θ)⇒P (〈p, w′〉, θ′).
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Thus, we get:
Theorem 1. Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS, we can
compute an equivalent PDS P ′ = (P ′,Γ,∆′) such that |∆′| =(|∆|+ |∆c| · |Γ|) · 2O(|∆|+|∆c|) and |P ′| = |P | · 2O(|∆|+|∆c|).
C. From SM-PDSs to Symbolic PDSs
Instead of recording the phases θ of the SM-PDS in the
control points of the equivalent PDS, we can have a more com-
pact translation from SM-PDSs to symbolic PDSs [Sch02],
where each SM-PDS rule is represented by a single, symbolic
transition, where the different values of the phases are encoded
in a symbolic way using relations between phases:
Definition 2. A symbolic pushdown system is a tuple P =
(P,Γ, δ), where P is a set of control points, Γ is the stack
alphabet, and δ is a set of symbolic rules of the form:
〈p, γ〉 R↪−−−−→ 〈p′, w〉, where R ⊆ 2∆∪∆c × 2∆∪∆c is a
relation.
A symbolic PDS defines a transition relation ;P between
SM-PDS configurations as follows: Let c = (〈p, γw′〉, θ) be
a configuration and let 〈p, γ〉 R↪−−−−→ 〈p′, w〉 be a rule in
δ, then: (〈p, γw′〉, θ) ;P (〈p′, ww′〉, θ′) for (θ, θ′) ∈ R. Let
;∗P be the transitive, reflexive closure of ;P . Then, given a
SM-PDS P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c), we can compute an equivalent
symbolic PDS P ′ = (P,Γ,∆′) such that: Initially, ∆′ = ∅;
• For every 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆, add 〈p, γ〉 Rid↪−−−−→
〈p′, w〉 to ∆′, where Rid is the identity relation.
• For every r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c and every γ ∈ Γ,
add 〈p, γ〉 R↪−−−−→ 〈p′, γ〉 to ∆′, where R = {(θ1, θ2) ∈
2∆∪∆c × 2∆∪∆c | r ∈ θ1 and θ2 = (θ1 \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}}.
It is easy to see that:
Proposition 2. (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′) iff
(〈p, w〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, w′〉, θ′).
Proof:
⇒: we will show that if (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′), then
(〈p, w〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, w′〉, θ′). There are two cases depending
on the form of the rule that led to this transition.
• Case θ = θ′, it means that the transition does not
correspond to a self-modifying transition rule. Thus there
is a rule r ∈ θ of the form r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, u′〉
that led to this transition. Let u be such that w =
γu,w′ = u′u. By construction of the symbolic pushdown
system P ′, 〈p, γ〉 Rid↪−−−−→ 〈p′, u′〉 ∈ ∆′, therefore,
(〈p, γu〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, u′u〉, θ) holds. This implies that
(〈p, w〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, w′〉, θ′).
• Case θ 6= θ′, it means that the transition corresponds
to a self-modifying transition rule. Thus there is a rule
r ∈ θ of the form r = p (r1,r2)↪−−−−→ p′ that led to this
transition and θ′ = (θ\{r1}) ∪ {r2}. Let u be such that
w = γu,w′ = γu. By construction of the symbolic
pushdown system P ′, 〈p, γ〉 R↪−−−−→ 〈p′, γ〉 ∈ ∆′ and
R = {(θ, θ′) ∈ 2∆∪∆c × 2∆∪∆c | r ∈ θ and θ′ = (θ \
{r1}) ∪ {r2}}, therefore, (〈p, γu〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, γu〉, θ′)
holds. This implies that (〈p, w〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, w′〉, θ′).
⇐: we will show that if (〈p, w〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, w′〉, θ′), then
(〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′). Let γ ∈ Γ, u, u′ ∈ Γ∗ be such
that w = γu,w′ = u′u. There are two cases.
• Case θ = θ′. Let 〈p, γ〉 Rid↪−−−−→ 〈p′, u′〉 ∈ ∆′ be the
rule applied to this transition. By the construction of
the symbolic pushdown system P ′, there must exist a
rule r ∈ θ s.t. r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, u′〉 ∈ ∆. Therefore,
(〈p, γu〉, θ) ⇒P (〈p′, u′u〉, θ) holds. This implies that
(〈p, w〉, θ)⇒P (〈p′, w′〉, θ′).
• Case θ 6= θ′. Let 〈p, γ〉 R↪−−−−→ 〈p′, γ〉 ∈ ∆′ be the rule
applied to this transition with w′ = γu. By the construc-
tion of the symbolic pushdown system P ′, there must
exist a rule r ∈ θ of the form r = p (r1,r2)↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c
s.t. R = {(θ1, θ2) ∈ 2∆∪∆c × 2∆∪∆c | r ∈ θ1 and θ2 =
(θ1 \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}}. Therefore, θ′ = (θ\{r1}) ∪ {r2}
and (〈p, γu〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, γu〉, θ′) hold. This implies that
(〈p, w〉, θ) ;P′ (〈p′, w′〉, θ′).
2
Thus, we get:
Theorem 2. Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS, we can
compute an equivalent symbolic PDS P ′ = (P ′,Γ,∆′) such
that |P ′| = |P |, |∆′| = |∆| + |∆c| · |Γ|, and the size of the
relations used in the symbolic transitions is 2O(|∆|+|∆c|).
III. MODELING SELF-MODIFYING CODE WITH SM-PDSS
A. Self-modifying instructions
There are different techniques to implement self-modifying
code. We consider in this work code that uses self-modifying
instructions. These are instructions that can access the memory
locations and write onto them, thus changing the instructions
that are in these memory locations. In assembly, the only
instructions that can do this are the mov instructions. In this
case, the self-modifying instructions are of the form mov l v,
where l is a location of the program that stores executable
data and v is a value. This instruction replaces the value at
location l (in the binary code) with the value v. This means
if at location l there is a binary value v′ that is involved in
an assembly instruction i1, and if by replacing v′ by v, we
obtain a new assembly instruction i2, then the instruction i1
is replaced by i2. E.g., ff is the binary code of push, 40 is
the binary code of inc, 0c is the binary code of jmp, c6
is the binary code of mov, etc. Thus, if we have mov l ff,
and if at location l there was initially the value 40 01 (which
corresponds to the assembly instruction inc %edx), then 40 is
replaced by ff, which means the instruction inc %edx is
replaced by push 01. If at location l there was initially the
value c6 01 02 (which corresponds to the assembly instruction
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mov edx 0x2), then c6 is replaced by ff, which means the
instruction mov edx 0x2 is replaced by push 02.
Note that if the instructions i1 and i2 do not have the
same number of operands, then mov l v will, in addition to
replacing i1 by i2, change several other instructions that follow
i1. Currently, we cannot handle this case, thus we assume that
i1 and i2 have the same number of operands.
Note also that mov l v is self-modifying only if l is a
location of the program that stores executable data, otherwise,
it is not; e.g., mov eax v does not change the instructions
of the program, it just writes the value v to the register eax.
Thus, from now on, by self-modifying instruction, we mean
an instruction of the form mov l v, where l is a location of
the program that stores executable data. Moreover, to ensure
that only one instruction is modified, we assume that the
corresponding instructions i1 and i2 have the same number
of operands.
B. From self-modifying code to SM-PDS
We show in what follows how to build a SM-PDS from
a binary program. We suppose we are given an oracle O
that extracts from the binary code a corresponding assembly
program, together with informations about the values of the
registers and the memory locations at each control point of the
program. In our implementation, we use Jakstab [Kin08] to
get this oracle. We translate the assembly program into a self-
modifying pushdown system where the control locations store
the control points of the binary program and the stack memics
the program’s stack. The non self-modifying instructions of the
program define the rules ∆ of the SM-PDS (which are standard
PDS rules), and can be obtained following the translation
of [ST12] that models non self-modifying instructions of the
program by a PDS.
As for the self-modifying instructions of the program, they
define the set of changing rules ∆c. As explained above, these
are instructions of the form mov l v, where l is a location
of the program that stores executable data. This instruction
replaces the value at location l (in the binary code) with the
value v. Let i1 be the initial instruction involving the location l,
and let i2 be the new instruction involving the location l, after
applying the mov l v instruction. As mentioned previously,
we assume that i1 and i2 have the same number of operands
(to ensure that only one instruction is modified). Let r1 (resp.
r2) be the SM-PDS rule corresponding to the instruction i1
(resp. i2). Suppose from control point n to n′, we have this
mov l v instruction, then we add n
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ n′ to ∆c. This
is the SM-PDS rule corresponding to the instruction mov l v
at control point n.
IV. REPRESENTING INFINITE SETS OF CONFIGURATIONS
OF A SM-PDS
Multi-automata were introduced in [BEM97], [EHRS00] to
finitely represent regular infinite sets of configurations of a
PDS. A configuration c = (〈p, w〉, θ) of a SM-PDS involves
a PDS configuration 〈p, w〉, together with the current set of
transition rules (phase) θ. To finitely represent regular infinite
sets of such configurations, we extend multi-automata in order
to take into account the phases θ:
Definition 3. Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS. A P-
automaton is a tuple A = (Q,Γ, T, P, F ) where Γ is the
automaton alphabet, Q is a finite set of states, P×2∆∪∆c ⊆ Q
is the set of initial states, T ⊂ Q× ((Γ∪{}))×Q is the set
of transitions and F ⊆ Q is the set of final states.
If
(
q, γ, q′
) ∈ T , we write q γ−→T q′. We extend this no-
tation in the obvious manner to sequences of symbols: (1)
∀q ∈ Q, q −→T q, and (2) ∀q, q′ ∈ Q, θ′ ∈ 2∆∪∆c ,∀γ ∈
Γ ∪ {},∀w ∈ Γ∗ for w = γ0γ1 · · · γn, q γw−−→T q′ iff ∃q′′ ∈
Q, q
γ−→T q′′ and q′′ w−−→T q′. If q w−→T q′ holds, we say that
q
w−→T q′ is a path of A. A configuration (〈p, w〉, θ) is accepted
by A iff A contains a path (p, θ) γ0−−→T q1 γ1−−→T q2 · · · qn γn−−→T q
where q ∈ F . Let L(A) be the set of configurations accepted
by A. Let C be a set of configurations of the SM-PDS P . C is
regular if there exists a P-automaton A such that C = L(A)
V. EFFICIENT COMPUTATION OF pre∗ IMAGES
Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS, and let A =
(Q,Γ, T, P, F ) be a P-automaton that represents a regular
set of configurations C ( C = L(A)). To compute pre∗(C),
one can use the translation of Section II-B to compute an
equivalent PDS, and then apply the algorithms of [BEM97],
[EHRS00]. This procedure is too complex since the size of
the obtained PDS is huge. One can also use the translation of
Section II-C to compute an equivalent symbolic PDS, and then
use the algorihms of [Sch02]. However, this procedure is not
optimal neither since the number of elements of the relations
considered in the rules of the symbolic PDSs are huge. We
present in this section a direct and more efficient algorithm
that computes pre∗(C) without any need to translate the SM-
PDS to an equivalent PDS or symbolic PDS. We assume
w.l.o.g. that A has no transitions leading to an initial state. We
also assume that the self-modifying rules r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ in
∆c are such that r 6= r1. This is not a restriction since a rule of
the form r = p
(r,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ can be replaced by these rules that
meet this constraint: r = p
(r⊥,r⊥)
↪−−−−→ pi and pi
(r,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′,
where r⊥ is a new fake rule that we can add to all phases.
The construction of Apre∗ follows the same idea as for
standard pushdown systems (see [BEM97], [EHRS00]). It
consists in adding iteratively new transitions to the automaton
A according to saturation rules (reflecting the backward
application of the transition rules in the system), while the
set of states remains unchanged. Therefore, let Apre∗ be the
P-automaton (Q,Γ, T ′, P, F ), where T ′ is computed using the
following saturation rules: initially T ′ = T .
α1: If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p1, w〉 ∈ ∆, where w ∈ Γ∗. For every
θ ⊆ ∆ ∪ ∆c s.t. r ∈ θ, if there exists in T ′ a path
pi = (p1, θ)
w−−→T q, then add ((p, θ), γ, q) to T ′.
α2: if r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p1 ∈ ∆c for every θ ⊆ ∆ ∪ ∆c s.t.
r ∈ θ, r2 ∈ θ and for every γ ∈ Γ, if there exists in T ′
a transition t = (p1, θ)
γ−→T q, then add ((p, θ′), γ, q) to
T ′ where θ = (θ′ \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}.
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Δ :
r1 : ⟨p0, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p1, γ1γ0⟩     r2 : ⟨p5, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p2, γ2γ0⟩
r3 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p3, ϵ⟩          r4 : ⟨p4, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p0, ϵ⟩
r5 : ⟨p1, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p4, γ0⟩
Δc :
 r′   : p3 
θ0 = {r5, r2, r3, r4, r′ } 
p0, θ0 s1 s2
γ0 γ0
p0, θ0 s1 s2
γ0 γ0
γ2
p4, θ0
γ0
p1, θ0
γ1
p3, θ1
γ0
p2, θ1
p5, θ1
γ1
↪ p4
(r1, r5)
Fig. 2: The automata A (left) and Apre∗ (right)
The procedure above terminates since there is a finite number
of states and phases.
Let us explain intuitively the role of the saturation rule
(α1). Let r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉 ∈ ∆. Consider a path in
the automaton of the form (p′, θ′) w−−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF , where
qF ∈ F . This means, by definition of P-automata, that the
configuration c = (〈p′, ww′〉, θ′) is accepted by Apre∗ . If r is
in θ′, then the configuration c′ = (〈p, γw′〉, θ′) is a predecessor
of c. Therefore, it should be added toApre∗ . This configuration
is accepted by the run (p, θ′) γ−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF added by rules
(α1).
Rule (α2) deals with modifying rules: Let r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→
p′ ∈ ∆c. Consider a path in the automaton of the form
(p′, θ′) γ−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF , where qF ∈ F . This means, by defi-
nition of P-automata, that the configuration c = (〈p′, γw′〉, θ′)
is accepted by Apre∗ . If r and r2 are in θ′, then the con-
figuration c′ = (〈p, γw′〉, θ) is a predecessor of c, where
θ′ = (θ \ {r1}) ∪ {r2}. Therefore, it should be added
to Apre∗ . This configuration is accepted by the run pi′ =
(p, θ)
γ−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF added by rules (α2).
Thus, we can show that:
Theorem 3. Apre∗ recognizes pre∗(L(A)).
Before proving this theorem, let us illustrate the construction
on 2 examples.
Example 2. Let us illustrate the procedure by an ex-
ample. Consider the SM-PDS with control points P =
{p0, p1, p2, p3, p4, p5} and ∆,∆c as shown in the left half
of Fig. 2. Let A be the automaton that accepts the set
C = {(〈p0, γ0γ0〉, θ0)}, also shown on the left where (p0, θ0)
is the initial state and s2 is the final state. The result of the
algorithm is shown in the right half of Fig. 2. The result is
obtained through the following steps:
1) First, we note that (p0, θ0)
−→T ′ (p0, θ0) holds. Since
〈p0, 〉 occurs on the right hand side of rule r4 and
r4 ∈ θ0, then Rule (α1) adds the transition (p4, θ0) γ0−→
(p0, θ0) to T ′.
2) Now that we have (p4, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ (p0, θ0), since r5 ∈ θ0,
Rule (α1) adds (p1, θ0)
γ1−→ (p0, θ0) to T ′.
3) Since we have (p4, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ (p0, θ0), the self-modifying
transition r′ ∈ θ0 can be applied. Thus, Rule (α2) adds
(p3, θ1)
γ0−→ (p0, θ0) to T ′ where θ1 = (θ0 \ {r5}) ∪
{r1} = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r′}.
4) Since (p3, θ1)
−→ (p3, θ1) and r3 ∈ θ1, Rule (α1) adds
(p2, θ1)
γ2−→ (p3, θ1) to T ′.
5) Then, there is a path (p2, θ1)
γ2−→T ′ (p3, θ1) γ0−→T ′
(p0, θ0). Since 〈p2, γ2γ0〉 occurs on the right hand side
of r2 and r2 ∈ θ1, then Rule (α1) adds the transition
(p5, θ1)
γ1−→ (p0, θ0) to T ′.
6) No further additions are possible. Thus, the procedure
terminates.
Example 3. Let us give another example. Consider the SM-
PDS with control points P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5} and ∆,∆c
as shown in the left half of Fig. 3. Let A be the automaton
that accepts the set C = {(〈p0, γ0γ0〉, θ0)} where (p0, θ0) is
the initial state and s2 is the final state as shown on the left.
The result Apre∗ of the algorithm is on the right half of Fig.
3. The result is obtained through the following steps:
1) Since (p0, θ0)
γ−→T ′ s1 and r1 ∈ θ0, then Rule (α1) adds
(p1, θ0)
γ1−→ s1 to T ′.
2) Since (p1, θ0)
γ1−→T ′ s1 and r2 ∈ θ0, Rule (α1) adds the
transition (p2, θ0)
γ2−→ s1 to T ′.
3) Since (p2, θ0)
−→T ′ (p2, θ0) and r3 ∈ θ0, Rule (α1) adds
the transition (p3, θ0)
γ0−→ (p2, θ0) to T ′.
4) Then, there is a path (p3, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ0) γ2−→T ′ s1
and r4 ∈ θ0, Rule α1 adds the transition (p4, θ0) γ1−→ s1
to T ′.
5) Because (p4, θ0)
−→T ′ (p4, θ0) and r5 ∈ θ0, Rule (α1)
adds the transition (p0, θ0)
γ0−→ (p4, θ0) to T ′.
6) Since (p0, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ (p4, θ0) and r1 ∈ θ0, Rule (α1)
adds the transition (p1, θ0)
γ1−→ (p4, θ0) to T ′. Then,
since r2 ∈ θ0, Rule (α1) adds the transition (p2, θ0) γ2−→
(p4, θ0) to T ′.
7) Since there is a path (p3, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ0) γ2−→T ′
(p4, θ0) and r4 ∈ θ0, Rule (α1) adds (p4, θ0) γ1−→
(p4, θ0) to T ′.
8) Since (p4, θ0)
γ1−→T ′ s1, (p4, θ0) γ1−→T ′ (p4, θ0) and
r1c , r2 ∈ θ0, Rule (α2) adds (p5, θ1) γ1−→ s1 and
(p5, θ1)
γ1−→ (p4, θ0) to T ′ where θ1 = (θ0\{r2})∪r6 =
{r1, r3, r4, r5, r6, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}. For the same reason,
since (p0, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ (p4, θ0), (p0, θ0) γ−→T ′ s1 and r1,∈
θ1, r2c ∈ θ0, Rule (α2) adds the transitions (p5, θ2) γ0−→
(p4, θ0) and (p5, θ2)
γ0−→ s1 to T ′ where θ2 = (θ0 \
{r1}) ∪ {r7} = {r2, r3, r4, r5, r7, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}.
9) Since (p5, θ1)
γ1−→T ′ s1, (p5, θ1) γ1−→T ′ (p4, θ0) and r6 ∈
θ1, Rule (α1) adds the transitions (p2, θ1)
γ2−→ s1 and
(p2, θ1)
γ2−→ (p4, θ0) to T ′.
10) Since (p2, θ1)
−→T ′ (p2, θ1) and r3 ∈ θ1, Rule (α1) adds
(p3, θ1)
γ0−→ (p2, θ1).
11) Because there are paths (p3, θ1)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ1) γ2−→T ′
(p4, θ0) and (p3, θ1)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ1) γ2−→T ′ s1, Rule
(α1) adds the transitions (p4, θ1)
γ1−→ (p4, θ0) and
(p4, θ1)
γ1−→ s1 to T ′.
12) Since (p4, θ0)
−→T ′ (p4, θ0) and r5 ∈ θ1, Rule (α1) adds
(p0, θ1)
γ0−→ (p4, θ1).
13) Now we have (p0, θ1)
γ0−→T ′ (p4, θ1) and r2c , r1 ∈ θ1,
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Δ :
r1 : ⟨p1, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p0, γ0⟩   r2 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p1, γ1⟩
r3 : ⟨p3, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p2, ϵ⟩   r4 : ⟨p4, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p3, γ0γ2⟩
r5 : ⟨p0, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p4, ϵ⟩   r6 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p5, γ1⟩
r7 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p5, ϵ⟩
Δc :
 r1c : p5
 r
2
c : p5
 r3c : p2
  r
4
c : p4  
θ0 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
p0, θ0 s1 s2
p1, θ0
γ1
p4, θ0
γ1γ0
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γ1
p5, θ2
γ0
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θ2 = {r2, r3, r4, r5, r7, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
p2, θ1
γ0 γ0
γ2
p3, θ1
γ0
p4, θ1
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γ0
γ1
p2, θ0
γ2
p3, θ0
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γ1
γ1
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γ1
θ3 = {r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
p5, θ3γ0 p2, θ3γ2
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p3, θ3
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p4, θ3
γ1
p0, θ3
γ0
p2, θ2
γ0
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p3, θ2
γ0
p4, θ2
γ1
p0, θ2 γ0
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γ2↪
↪
p2
↪
↪
(r6, r2)
(r7, r1)
(r2, r6)
(r1, r7)
p3
p0
p4
Fig. 3: The automata A (left) and Apre∗ (right)
Rule (α2) adds the transition (p5, θ3)
γ0−→ (p4, θ1) to
T ′ where θ3 = {r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}. For the
same reason, since (p3, θ1)
γ0−→ (p2, θ1) and r3c , r6 ∈ θ1,
Rule α2 adds the transition (p2, θ0)
γ0−→ (p2, θ1) to T ′
because θ0 = (θ1 \ {r6}) ∪ {r2}.
14) Since (p5, θ3)
−→T ′ (p5, θ3) and r7 ∈ θ3, Rule (α1) adds
the transition (p2, θ3)
γ2−→ (p5, θ3) to T ′.
15) Because (p2, θ3)
−→T ′ (p2, θ3) and r3 ∈ θ3, Rule (α1)
adds the transition (p3, θ3)
γ0−→ (p2, θ3) to T ′. Then,
since there is a path (p3, θ3)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ3) γ2−→T ′
(p5, θ3) and r4 ∈ θ3, Rule (α1) adds the transition
(p4, θ3)
γ1−→ (p5, θ3) to T ′. Then, since r5 ∈ θ3, Rule
(α1) adds the transition (p0, θ3)
γ0−→ (p4, θ3) to T ′.
16) Since (p3, θ3)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ3) and r3c ∈ θ3, Rule (α2)
adds the transition (p2, θ2)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ3) to T ′ where
(θ3 \ {r6}) ∪ {r2} = θ2. Meanwhile, since (p2, θ3) γ2−→
(p5, θ3) and r4c , r7 ∈ θ3, Rule (α2) adds the transition
(p4, θ1)
γ2−→ (p5, θ3) to T ′ where (θ3\{r7})∪{r1} = θ1.
17) Because r7 ∈ θ2 and (p5, θ2) −→T ′ (p5, θ2), Rule (α1)
adds the transition (p2, θ2)
γ2−→ (p5, θ2) to T ′.
18) Since (p2, θ2)
−→T ′ (p2, θ2) and r3 ∈ θ2, Rule (α1)
adds (p3, θ2)
γ0−→T ′ (p2, θ2) to T ′. Then, there is a path
(p3, θ2)
γ0γ2−−−→∗T ′ (p5, θ2), since r4 ∈ θ2, Rule (α1) adds
the transition (p4, θ2)
γ1−→T ′ (p5, θ2) to T ′. Then, since
(p5, θ2)
−→T ′ (p5, θ2) and r5 ∈ θ2, Rule (α1) adds the
transition (p0, θ2)
γ0−→ (p4, θ2) to T ′.
19) Now we have (p2, θ2)
γ2−→T ′ (p5, θ2) and (p2, θ2) γ0−→T ′
(p2, θ3), since r4c , r7 ∈ θ2, Rule α2 adds the transitions
(p4, θ0)
γ2−→ (p5, θ2) and (p4, θ0) γ0−→ (p2, θ3) to T ′
where (θ2 \ {r7}∪){r1} = θ0.
20) Since (p4, θ2)
γ1−→T ′ (p5, θ2) and r2, r1c ∈ θ2, Rule (α2)
adds the transition (p5, θ3)
γ1−→ (p5, θ2) to T ′ where
(θ2 \ {r2}) ∪ {r6} = θ3.
21) Since (p5, θ3)
γ1−→T ′ (p5, θ2) and r6 ∈ θ3, Rule (α1)
adds the transition (p2, θ3)
γ2−→ (p5, θ2) to T ′.
22) No further additions are possible, so the procedure
terminates.
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us now prove Theorem 3. To prove this theorem, we
first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For every configuration (〈p, w〉, θ0) ∈ L(A), if
(〈p′, w′〉, θ) ⇒∗P (〈p, w〉, θ0), then (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for some
final state q of Apre∗ .
Proof: Assume (〈p′, w′〉, θ) i⇒P (〈p, w〉, θ0). We proceed by
induction on i.
Basis. i = 0. Then θ = θ0, p′ = p and w = w′. Since
(〈p, w〉, θ0) ∈ L(A), we have (p, θ0) w−→T ′ q always holds
for some final state q i.e. (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q holds.
Step. i > 0. Then there exists a configuration (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′)
such that
(〈p′, w′〉, θ)⇒P (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) i−1⇒P (〈p, w〉, θ0)
We apply the induction hypothesis to (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) i−1⇒
(〈p, w〉, θ0), and obtain (p′′, θ′′) u−→T ′ q for q ∈ F .
Let w1, u1 ∈ Γ∗, γ′ ∈ Γ be such that w′ = γ′w1, u = u1w1.
Let q′ be a state of Apre∗ s.t.
(p′′, θ′′) u1−−→T ′q′ w1−−→T ′q (1)
There are two cases depending on which rule is applied to get
(〈p′, w′〉, θ)⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′).
1) Case (〈p′, w′〉, θ) ⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) is obtained by a rule
of the form: 〈p′, γ′〉 ↪→ 〈p′′, u1〉 ∈ ∆. In this case, θ′′ =
θ. By the saturation rule α1, we have
(p′, θ′′) γ
′−−→T ′q′ (2)
Putting (1) and (2) together, we can obtain that
pi = (p′, θ′′) γ
′−−→T ′q′ w1−−→T ′q (3)
Thus, (p′, θ′′) γ
′w1−−−−→T ′ q i.e. (p′, θ) w
′−−→ q for some final
state q ∈ F .
2) Case (〈p′, w′〉, θ) ⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) is obtained by a rule
of the form p′
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′′ ∈ ∆c. I.e θ′′ 6= θ. In this
case, u1 = γ′. By the saturation rule α2, we obtain that
(p′, θ) γ
′−−→T ′q′ where θ′′ = θ\{r1} ∪ {r2}. (4)
Putting (1) and (4) together, we have the following path
(p′, θ) γ
′−−→T ′q′ w1−−→T ′q. I.e. (p′, θ) w
′−−→T ′q for q ∈ F
(5)
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2Lemma 2. If a path pi = (p, θ) w−→T ′ q for θ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c is in
Apre∗ , then
(I) (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) holds for a configura-
tion (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t. (p′, θ0) w
′−−→T q in the initial P-
automaton A;
(II) Moreover, if q is an initial state i.e. in the form (p, θ),
then w′ = .
Proof: Let Apre∗ = (Q,Γ, T, P, F ) be the P-automaton
computed by the saturation procedure. In this proof, we use
−→
i T ′
to denote the transition relation of Apre∗ obtained
after adding i-transitions using the saturation procedure. In
particular, since initially Apre∗ = A, Apre∗ contains the path
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q where (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) ∈ L(A), then we write
(p′, θ0)
w′−→
0 T
q.
Let i be an index such that pi = (p, θ) w−→
i T ′
q holds. We
shall prove (I) by induction on i. Statement (II) then follows
immediately from the fact that initial states have no incoming
transitions in A.
Basis. i = 0. Since (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p, w〉, θ) always holds,
take then p = p′, w = w′ and θ0 = θ.
Step. i > 0. Let t = ((p1, θ1), γ, q′) be the i-th transition
added to Apre∗ and j be the number of times that t is used
in the path (p, θ) w−→
i T ′
q. The proof is by induction on j. If
j = 0, then we have (p, θ) w−−→
i−1 T ′
q in the automaton, and we
apply the induction hypothesis (induction on i) then we obtain
(〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) for a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0)
s.t. (p′, θ0)
w′−−→T q in the initial P-automaton A. So assume
that j > 0. Then, there exist u and v such that w = uγv and
(p, θ)
u−−→
i−1 T ′
(p1, θ1)
γ−→
i T ′
q′ v−→
i T ′
q (1)
The application of the induction hypothesis (induction on
i) to (p, θ) u−−→
i−1 T ′
(p1, θ1) (notice that (p1, θ1) is an initial
state) gives that
(〈p, u〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p1, 〉, θ1) (2)
There are 2 cases depending on whether transition t was
added by saturation rule α1 or α2.
1) Case t was added by rule α1: There exist p2 ∈ P and
w2 ∈ Γ∗ such that
r = 〈p1, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p2, w2〉 ∈ ∆ ∩ θ1 (3)
and Apre∗ contains the following path:
pi′ = (p2, θ1)
w2−−→
i−1 T ′
q′ v−→
i T ′
q (4)
Applying the transition rule r gets that
(〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒ (〈p2, w2v〉, θ1) (5)
By induction on j (since transition t is used j− 1 times
in pi′), we get from (4) that
(〈p2, w2v〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t. (p′, θ0) w
′−−→T ′q
in the initial P-automaton A
(6)
Putting (2) ,(5) and (6) together, we can obtain that
(〈p, w〉, θ) = (〈p, uγv〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒
(〈p2, w2v〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0)
such that (p′, θ0)
w′−−→T q in the initial P-automaton A
2) Case t was added by rule α2 : there exist p2 ∈ P and
θ′′ ⊆ ∆ ∪∆c such that
p1
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p2 ∈ ∆c ∩ θ′′, θ′′ = (θ1\{r1}) ∪ {r2} (7)
and the following path in the current automaton ( self-
modifying rule won’t change the stack) with r ∈ θ′′ :
(p2, θ
′′)
γ−−→
i−1 T ′
q′ v−→
i T ′
q (8)
Applying the transition rule, we can get from (7) that
(〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒ (〈p2, γv〉, θ′′) (9)
We can apply the induction hypothesis (on j) to (8), and
obtain
(〈p2, γv〉, θ′′)⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t. (p′, θ0) w
′−−→T q
in the initial P-automaton A
(10)
From (2),(9) and (10), we get
(〈p, w〉, θ) = (〈p, uγv〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p1, γv〉, θ1)⇒
(〈p2, γv〉, θ′′)⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0)
such that (p′, θ0)
w′−−→T q in the initial P-automaton A.
2
Then, we can prove Theorem 3:
Proof: Let (〈p, w〉, θ) be a configuration of pre∗(L(A)). Then
(〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) for a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0)
s.t. (p′, θ0)
w′−−→T ′q is a path in A for q ∈ F . By lemma 1,
we can obtain that there exists a path (p, θ) w−→T ′ q for some
final state q of Apre∗ . So (〈p, w〉, θ) is recognized by Apre∗ .
Conversely, let (〈p, w〉, θ) be a configuration accepted by
Apre∗ i.e. there exists a path (p, θ) w−→T ′ q in Apre∗ for some
final state q ∈ F . By lemma 2, there exists a configuration
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t. there exist a path (p′, θ0) w
′
−→T q in the initial
automaton A and (〈p, w〉, θ) ⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ0). Because q is
a final state, we have (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) ∈ L(A) i.e. (〈p, w〉, θ) ∈
pre∗(L(A)).
2
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VI. EFFICIENT COMPUTATION OF post∗ IMAGES
Let P = (P,Γ,∆,∆c) be a SM-PDS, and let A =
(Q,Γ, T, P, F ) be a P-automaton that represents a regular set
of configurations C ( C = L(A)). Similarly, it is not optimal
to compute post∗(C) using the translations of Sections II-B
and II-C to compute equivalent PDSs or symbolic PDSs, and
then apply the algorithms of [EHRS00], [Sch02]. We present
in this section a direct and efficient algorithm that computes
post∗(C). We assume w.l.o.g. that A has no transitions leading
to an initial state. Moreover, we assume that the rules of ∆
are of the form 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w〉, where |w| ≤ 2. This is not a
restriction, indeed, a rule of the form 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ1 · · · γn〉,
n > 2 can be replaced by the following rules:
• 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p1, a1γn〉
• 〈p1, a1〉 ↪→ 〈p2, a2γn−1〉
• 〈p2, a2〉 ↪→ 〈p3, a3γn−2〉
• · · · ,
• 〈pn−2, an−2〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ1γ2〉
As previously, the construction of Apost∗ consists in adding
iteratively new transitions to the automaton A according to
saturation rules (reflecting the forward application of the
transition rules in the system). We define Apost∗ to be the
P-automaton (Q′,Γ, T ′, P, F ), where T ′ is computed using
the following saturation rules and Q′ is the smallest set s.t.
Q ⊆ Q′ and for every r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ1γ2〉 ∈ ∆, qθp′γ1 ∈
Q′ where qθp′γ1 is the new state labelled with p
′, γ1 and θ:
initially T ′ = T ;
β1: If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, 〉 ∈ ∆ and there exists in T ′ a path
pi = (p, θ)
γ−→T ′ q with r ∈ θ, then add ((p′, θ), , q) to
T ′.
β2: If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ′〉 ∈ ∆ and there exists in
T ′ a path pi = (p, θ) γ−→T ′ q with r ∈ θ, then add
((p′, θ), γ′, q) to T ′.
β3: If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ1γ2〉 ∈ ∆ and there exists in
T ′ a path pi = (p, θ) γ−→T ′ q with r ∈ θ. Add t′ =
((p′, θ), γ1, qθp′γ1) and t
′′ = (qθp′γ1 , γ2, q) to T
′.
β4: if r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c and there exists in T ′ a path
pi = (p, θ)
γ−→T ′ q, where γ ∈ Γ with r ∈ θ, and r1 ∈ θ,
then add t′ = ((p′, θ′), γ, q) where θ′ = (θ \ {r1}) ∪
{r2}}.
The procedure above terminates since there is a finite
number of states and phases.
Let us explain intuitively the role of the saturation rules
above. Consider a path in the automaton of the form
(p, θ)
γ−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF , where qF ∈ F . This means, by defi-
nition of P-automata, that the configuration c = (〈p, γw′〉, θ)
is accepted by Apost∗ .
Let r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, 〉 ∈ ∆. If r is in θ, then the
configuration c′ = (〈p′, w′〉, θ) is a successor of c. Therefore,
it should be added to Apost∗ . This configuration is accepted
by the run (p′, θ) −→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF added by rules (β1).
If θ contains the rule r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ′〉 ∈ ∆, then
the configuration c′ = (〈p′, γ′w′〉, θ) is a successor of c.
Therefore, it should be added to Apost∗ . This configuration is
accepted by the run (p′, θ) γ
′−−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF added by rules
(β2).
If r = 〈p, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, γ1γ2〉 ∈ ∆ is in θ, then the configu-
ration c′ = (〈p′, γ1γ2w′〉, θ) is a successor of c. Therefore, it
should be added to Apost∗ . This configuration is accepted by
the run (p′, θ) γ1−−→T ′ qθp′γ1
γ2−−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF added by rules
(β3).
Rule (β4) deals with modifying rules: Let r = p
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→
p′ ∈ ∆c. If r and r1 are in θ, then the configuration c′ =
(〈p′, γw′〉, θ′) is a successor of c, where θ′ = (θ\{r1})∪{r2}.
Therefore, it should be added to Apost∗ . This configuration is
accepted by the run (p′, θ′) γ−→T ′ q w
′−−→T ′ qF added by rules
(β4).
Thus, we can show that:
Theorem 4. Apost∗ recognizes the set post∗(L(A)).
Before proving this theorem, let us illustrate the construction
on 2 examples.
p0, θ0 s1 s2
γ0 γ0
Δ :
r1 : ⟨p0, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p1, γ1γ0⟩     r2 : ⟨p1, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p2, γ2γ1⟩
r3 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p3, γ0⟩          r4 : ⟨p4, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p1, ϵ⟩
r5 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p4, γ1⟩
Δc :
 r′  : p3 
θ0 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r′ } 
p0, θ0 s1 s2
γ0 γ0
p1, θ0 qθ0p1γ1
γ1
γ0
p2, θ0 qθ0p2γ2
γ2
γ1
p3, θ0
γ0
p4, θ1
γ0
p1, θ1
ϵ
p2, θ1qθ1p2γ2
γ2
γ1
γ1
(r3, r5)↪ p4
Fig. 4: The automata A (left) and Apost∗ (right)
Example 4. Let us illustrate this procedure by an exam-
ple. Consider the SM-PDS shown in the left half of Fig.
4 and the automaton A from Fig. 4 that accepts the set
C = {(〈p0, γ0γ0〉, θ0)} where (p0, θ0) is the initial state and
s2 is the final state. Then the result Apost∗ of the algorithm is
shown in the right half of Fig. 4. The result is derived through
the following steps:
1) First, since (p0, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ s1 and r1 ∈ θ0, Rule (β3)
generates a new state qθ0p1γ1 and adds the two transitions:
(p1, θ0)
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1 and qθ0p1γ1
γ0−→ s1 to T ′.
2) Since (p1, θ0)
γ1−→T ′ qθ0p1γ1 and r2 ∈ θ0, Rule (β3)
generates a new state qθ0p2γ2 and adds two transitions
: (p2, θ0)
γ2−→ qθ0p2γ2 and qθ0p2γ2
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1 to T ′.
3) Because (p2, θ0)
γ2−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r3 ∈ θ0, Rule (β1)
adds the transition (p3, θ0)
γ0−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
4) Since (p3, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r′ ∈ θ0, Rule (β4) adds
the transition (p4, θ1)
γ0−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′ where θ1 = (θ0 \{r3}) ∪ {r5} = {r1, r2, r4, r5, r′}.
5) Since (p4, θ1)
γ0−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r4 ∈ θ1, Rule (β1) adds
the transition (p1, θ1)
−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
6) Then, since there is a path (p1, θ1)
γ1−→∗T ′ qθ0p1γ1 and
r2 ∈ θ1, Rule (β3) generates new state qθ1p2,γ2 and adds
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two transitions (p2, θ1)
γ2−→ qθ1p2,γ2 and qθ1p2,γ2
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1
to T ′.
7) Since (p2, θ1)
γ2−→T ′ qθ1p2,γ2 and r5 ∈ θ1, Rule (β2) adds
the transition (p4, θ1)
γ1−→ qθ1p2,γ2 to T ′.
8) No unprocessed matches remain. The procedure termi-
nates.
Example 5. Let us illustrate this procedure by another ex-
ample. Consider the SM-PDS shown in the left half of Fig. 5
where (p0, θ0) is the initial state and s2 is the final state. The
result Apost∗ of the algorithm is shown in the right half of
Fig. 5 obtained as follows:
1) First, since (p0, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ s1 and r1 ∈ θ0, Rule (β3)
generates a new state qθ0p1γ1 and adds two transitions:
(p1, θ0)
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1 and qθ0p1γ1
γ0−→ s1 to T ′.
2) Since (p1, θ0)
γ1−→T ′ qθ0p1γ1 and r2 ∈ θ0, Rule (β3)
generates a new state qθ0p2γ2 and adds two transitions:
(p2, θ0)
γ2−→ qθ0p2γ2 and qθ0p2γ2
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1 to T ′.
3) Because (p2, θ0)
γ2−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r3 ∈ θ0, Rule (β2)
adds (p3, θ0)
γ1−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
4) Since (p3, θ0)
γ1−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r1c , r1 ∈ θ0, Rule (β4)
adds the transition (p4, θ1)
γ1−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′ where θ1 =
(θ0 \ {r1}) ∪ {r5}.
5) Since (p4, θ1)
γ1−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r4 ∈ θ1, Rule (β1) adds
the transition (p0, θ1)
−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′. Then there is a
path (p0, θ1)
γ1−→∗T ′ qθ0p1γ1 , since r5 ∈ θ1, Rule (β2) adds
the transition (p5, θ1)
γ0−→ qθ0p1γ1 to T ′.
6) Since (p5, θ1)
γ0−→T ′ qθ0p1γ1 and r4c , r5 ∈ θ1, Rule (β4)
adds the transition (p0, θ0)
γ0−→ qθ0p1γ1 to T ′ where (θ1 \{r5}) ∪ {r1} = θ0.
7) Since (p0, θ0)
γ0−→T ′ qθ0p1γ1 and r1 ∈ θ0, Rule (β3) adds
the transitions (p1, θ0)
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1 and qθ0p1γ1
γ0−→ qθ0p1γ1 to
T ′.
8) Because (p4, θ1)
γ1−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r2c ∈ θ1, Rule (β4)
adds the transition (p2, θ2)
γ1−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
9) Since (p2, θ2)
γ1−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r6 ∈ θ2, Rule (β2) adds
the transition (p4, θ2)
γ0−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
10) Since p4, θ2
γ0−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 holds and r6, r3c ∈ θ2, Rule
(β4) adds the transition (p5, θ1)
γ0−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
11) Then, since (p5, θ1)
γ0−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 and r4c ∈ θ1, Rule (β4)
adds the transition (p0, θ0)
γ0−→ qθ0p2γ2 to T ′.
12) Since r1 ∈ θ0 and (p0, θ0) γ0−→T ′ qθ0p2γ2 , Rule (β3) adds
two transitions: (p1, θ0)
γ1−→ qθ0p1γ1 and qθ0p1γ1
γ0−→ qθ0p2γ2
to T ′.
13) No more rules can be applied. Thus, the procedure
terminates.
A. Proof of Theorem 4
Let us now prove Theorem 4. To prove this theorem, we
first show the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For every configuration (〈p, w〉, θ0) ∈ L(A),
if (〈p, w〉, θ0) ⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ) then we have a path pi =
(p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for some final state q of Apost∗ .
Proof:
Let i be the index s.t. (〈p, w〉, θ0) i⇒ (〈p′, w′〉, θ) holds. We
proceed by induction on i.
Basis. i = 0. Then p′ = p, w = w′ and θ0 = θ. Since
(〈p, w〉, θ0) ∈ L(A), we have (p, θ0) w−→T ′ q for some final
state q that implies pi = (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q is a path of Apost∗ .
Step. i > 0. Then there exists a configuration (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′)
with
(〈p, w〉, θ0) i−1⇒ (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′)⇒ (〈p′, w′〉, θ)
By applying the induction hypothesis (induction on i), we can
get that
(p′′, θ′′) u−→T ′ q for some q ∈ F (1)
Then, let γ ∈ Γ, u1, w1 ∈ Γ∗ be such that u = γu1, w′ =
w1u1. Let q1 be a state of Apost∗ s.t. we have the following
path in Apost∗ :
(p′′, θ′′)
γ−→T ′ q1 u1−−→T ′q (2)
There are two cases depending on whether (〈p′′, u〉, θ′′) ⇒
(〈p′, w′〉, θ) is corresponding to a self-modifying transition
(i.e. (θ′′ = θ)) or not.
1) Case: θ′′ = θ. Then there exists a transition rule r :
〈p′′, γ〉 ↪→ 〈p′, w1〉 ∈ ∆ s.t. r ∈ θ. There are three
possible cases depending on the length of w1 :
- Case |w1| = 0 i.e. w1 = , by applying the
saturation rule β1, we can get
(p′, θ) −→T ′ q1 (3)
Putting (2) and (3) together, we can have
(p′, θ) −→T ′ q1 u1−−→T ′ q i.e. (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for
some final state q of Apost∗ .
- Case |w1| = 1, then let γ′ ∈ Γ s.t. w1 = γ′. By
applying the saturation rule α2, we can get
(p′, θ)
γ′−→T ′ q1 (4)
Putting (2) and (4) together, we can have
(p′, θ)
γ′−→T ′ q1 u1−−→T ′ q i.e. (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for
some final state q of Apost∗ .
- Case |w1| = 2, let γ′0, γ′1 ∈ Γ be such that w1 =
γ′0γ
′
1. By applying the saturation rule α3, we can
get
(p′, θ)
γ′0−−→T ′qθp′γ′0
γ′1−−→T ′q1 (5)
Putting (2) and (5) together, then we have a
path (p′, θ)
γ′0−→T ′ qθp′γ′0
γ′1−→T ′ q1 u1−→T ′ q i.e.
(p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for some final state q of Apost∗ .
2) Case θ′′ 6= θ. Then there exists a self-modifying transi-
tion rule s.t. r : p′′
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p′ ∈ ∆c ∩ θ′′ and γ = w1
and θ = (θ′′\{r1}) ∪ {r2}.
By applying rule β4 to (2), we have the following path
in the automaton:
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p0, θ0 s1 s2
γ0 γ0
Δ :
r1 : ⟨p0, γ0⟩ ↪ ⟨p1, γ1γ0⟩   r2 : ⟨p1, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p2, γ2γ1⟩
r3 : ⟨p2, γ2⟩ ↪ ⟨p3, γ1⟩      r4 : ⟨p4, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p0, ϵ⟩
r5 : ⟨p0, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p5, γ0⟩      r6 : ⟨p2, γ1⟩ ↪ ⟨p4, γ0⟩
Δc :
 r1c : p3
 r2c : p4
 r3c : p4
 r4c : p5
θ0 = {r1, r2, r3 . r4, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
p0, θ0 s1 s2
γ0 γ0
p1, θ0 qθ0p1γ1
γ1
γ0
p2, θ0 qθ0p2γ2
γ1
γ2
p3, θ0
γ1
p4, θ1
γ1
p0, θ1
ϵ
p5, θ1
γ0
θ0 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
θ1 = {r2, r3, r4, r5, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
θ2 = {r2, r4, r5, r6, r1c , r2c , r3c , r4c}
p2, θ2
γ1
p4, θ2
γ0
γ0 γ0
γ0
γ0
γ0
p4
p2
p5
p0
↪
↪
↪
↪
(r1, r5)
(r3, r6)
(r6, r3)
(r5, r1)
Fig. 5: The automata A (left) and Apost∗ (right)
(p′, θ)
γ−→T ′ q1 u1−→T ′ q (5)
i.e. (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for some final state q of Apost∗ .
2
Lemma 4. If a path pi = (p, θ) w−→T ′ q is in Apost∗ , then the
following holds:
(I) if q is a state of A, then (〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p, w〉, θ) for
a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) such that (p′, θ0) w
′
−→T q
is a path in the initial P-automaton A ;
(II) if q is a new state of the form q = qθ1p1γ1 , then
(〈p1, γ1〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p, w〉, θ).
Proof: Let Apost∗ = (Q′,Γ, T ′, P, F ) be the P-automaton
computed by the saturation procedure. In this proof, we use
−→
i T ′
to denote the transition relation→T ′ of Apost∗ obtained
after adding i transitions using the saturation procedure.
Let i be an index such that (p, θ) w−→
i T ′
q holds. We prove
both parts of the lemma by induction on i.
Basis. i = 0. Only (I) applies. Thus, p′ = p, θ0 = θ and
w = w′. (〈p′, w′〉, θ)⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ) always holds.
Step. i > 1. Let t be the i-th transition added to the automaton.
Let j be the number of times that t is used in (p, θ) w−→
i T ′
q.
A has no transitions leading to initial states, and the algorithm
does not add any such transitions; therefore, if t starts in an
initial state, t can only be used at the start of the path.
The proof is by induction on j. If j = 0, then we
have (p, θ) w−−→
i−1 T ′
q. We apply the induction hypothesis
(induction on i) then we obtain that there exists a config-
uration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t. (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) ⇒∗ (〈p, w〉, θ) and
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q is a path of initial P-automaton A. So assume
that j > 0. We distinguish three possible cases:
1) If t was added by the rule β1, β2 or β3, then t =
((p1, θ1), v, q1), where v =  or v = γ1. Then, nec-
essarily, j = 1 and there exists the following path in the
current automaton:
(p, θ) = (p1, θ1)
v−→
i T ′
q1
w1−−→
i−1 T ′
q (1)
There are 2 cases depending on whether transition t was
added by rule β4 or not.
- Case t was added by rule β4: there exists a self-
modifying transition rule such that r = p2
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→
p1 ∈ ∆c, and there exists the following path in the
current automaton:
(p2, θ2)
v−−→
i−1 T ′
q1
w1−−→
i−1 T ′
q, θ1 = θ2\{r1} ∪ {r2}
(2)
By induction on (i), we get from (2) that there ex-
ists a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t. (p′, θ0) w
′
−→T
q is a path in the initial P-automaton A:
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p2, vw1〉, θ2) (3)
By applying the rule p2
(r1,r2)
↪−−−−→ p1, we get that
(〈p2, vw1〉, θ2)⇒ (〈p1, vw1〉, θ1) (4)
Thus, putting (3) and (4) together, we get
that there exists a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t.
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q is a path in the initial P-automaton
A and:
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p2, vw1〉, θ2)⇒
(〈p1, w〉, θ1) = (〈p, w〉, θ)
(5)
- Case t is added by β1 or β2: then there exists p2 ∈
P , γ2 ∈ Γ such that
r = 〈p2, γ2〉 ↪→ 〈p1, v〉 ∈ ∆ (6)
and Apost∗ contains the following path:
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(p2, θ1)
γ2−−→
i−1 T ′
q1
w1−−→
i−1 T ′
q (7)
By induction on (i), We can get from (7)
that there exists a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t.
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q is a path in the initial P-automaton
A and:
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p2, γ2w1〉, θ1) (8)
Thus, putting (6) and (8) together, we have
that there exists a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t.
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q is a path in the initial P-automaton
A and:
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p2, γ2w1〉, θ1)⇒
(〈p1, w〉, θ1) = (〈p, w〉, θ)
(9)
2) If t is the first transition added by rule β3 i.e. t is in
the form of ((p1, θ′′), γ1, qθ1p1γ1). If this transition is new,
then there are no transitions outgoing from qθ1p1γ1 . So the
only path using t is (p1, θ′′)
γ1−→
i T ′
qθ1p1γ1 . For this path,
we only need to prove part (II), and (〈p1, γ1〉, θ1) ⇒∗
(〈p1, γ1〉, θ1) holds trivially.
3) Let t = (qθ1p1γ1 , γ
′′, q′) be the second transition added by
saturation rule β3. Then there exist u, v ∈ Γ∗ s.t. w =
uγ′′v and the current automaton contains the following
path:
(p, θ)
u−−→
i−1 T ′
qθ1p1γ1
γ′′−→
i T ′
q′ v−→
i T ′
q (10)
Because t was added via the saturation rule, then there
exist p2 ∈ P , γ2 ∈ Γ and a rule of the form
〈p2, γ2〉 ↪→ 〈p1, γ1γ′′〉 ∈ ∆ ∩ θ1 (11)
and Apost∗ contains the following path:
(p2, θ1)
γ2−−→
i−1 T ′
q′ v−→
i T ′
q (12)
We apply the induction hypothesis on i and obtain that
(〈p1, γ1〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p, u〉, θ) (13)
We apply the induction hypothesis on i to ob-
tain that there exists a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t.
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q is a path in the initial P-automaton A
and:
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p2, γ2v〉, θ1) (14)
Thus, putting (11) (13) and (14) together, we have
that there exists a configuration (〈p′, w′〉, θ0) s.t.
(p′, θ0)
w′−→T q is a path in the initial P-automaton A
and:
(〈p′, w′〉, θ0)⇒∗ (〈p2, γ2v〉, θ1)⇒
(〈p1, γ1γ′′v〉, θ1)⇒∗ (〈p, uγ′′v〉, θ) = (〈p, w〉, θ)
(15)
2
Then we continue to prove Theorem 4:
Proof: Let (〈p′, w′〉, θ) be a configuration of post∗(L(A)).
Then there exists a configuration (〈p, w〉, θ0) such that there
exists a path (p, θ0)
w−→T q in the initial automaton A and
(〈p, w〉, θ0) ⇒∗ (〈p′, w′〉, θ). By Lemma 3, we can have
(p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q for q is a final state of Apost∗ . So (〈p′, w′〉, θ)
is recognized by Apost∗ .
Conversely, let (〈p′, w′〉, θ) be a configuration recognized by
Apost∗ . Then there exists a path (p′, θ) w
′
−→T ′ q in Apost∗
for some final state q. By Lemma 4, since q is a final
state, we have (〈p, w〉, θ0) ⇒∗P (〈p′, w′〉, θ) s.t. there exists
a configuration (〈p, w〉, θ0) s.t. (p, θ0) w−→T ′ q is a path in
the initial automaton A i.e. (〈p, w〉, θ0) ∈ L(A). Therefore,
(〈p′, w′〉, θ) ∈ post∗(L(A))
2
VII. EXPERIMENTS
A. Our algorithms vs. standard pre∗ and post∗ algorithms of
PDSs
We implemented our algorithms in a tool. To compare
the performance of our algorithms against the approach that
consists in translating the SM-PDS into an equivalent PDS or
symbolic PDS and then apply the standard post∗ and pre∗
algorithms for PDSs and symbolic PDSs [EHRS00], [Sch02],
we first applied our tool on randomly generated SM-PDSs of
various sizes. The results of the comparision using the pre∗
(resp. post∗) algorithms are reported in Table 1 (resp. Table
2).
In Table I, Column |∆|+ |∆c| is the number of transitions
of the SM-PDS (changing and non changing rules). Column
SM-PDS gives the cost it takes to apply our direct algorithm to
compute the pre∗ for the given SM-PDS. Column PDS shows
the cost it takes to get the equivalent PDS from the SM-PDS.
Column Symbolic PDS reports the cost it takes to get the
equivalent Symbolic PDS from the SM-PDS. Column Result1
reports the cost it takes to get the pre∗ analysis of Moped
[Sch02] for the PDS we got. Column Total1 is the total cost
it takes to translate the SM-PDS into a PDS and then apply
the standard pre∗ algorithm of Moped (Total1=PDS+Result1).
Column Result2 reports the cost it takes to get the pre∗
analysis of Moped for the symbolic PDS we got. Column
Total2 is the total cost it takes to translate the SM-PDS into a
symbolic PDS and then apply the standard pre∗ algorithm of
Moped (Total2=Symbolic PDS+Result2). ”error” in the table
means failure of Moped, because the size of the relations
involved in the symbolic transitions is huge. Hence, we mark
− for the total execution time. You can see that our direct
algorithm (Column SM-PDS) is much more efficient.
Table II shows the performance of our post∗ algorithm.
The meaning of the columns are exactly the same as for the
pre∗ case, but using the post∗ algorithms instead. You can
see from this table that applying our direct post∗ algorithm
on the SM-PDS is much better than translating the SM-PDS
to an equivalent PDS or symbolic PDS, and then applying the
standard post∗ algorithms of Moped. Going through PDSs or
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|∆| + |∆c| SM-PDS PDS Result1 Total1 Symbolic PDS Result2 Total2
10 + 3 0.08s & 2MB 0.15s & 3MB 0.00s 0.15s 0.10s & 2MB 0.00s 0.10s
13 + 3 0.10s & 2MB 0.15s & 3MB 0.00s 0.15s 0.10s & 2MB 0.00s 0.10s
13 + 3 0.12s & 2MB 0.15s & 3MB 0.00s 0.15s 0.10s & 2MB 0.00s 0.10s
43 + 7 0.24s &3MB 3.44s &4MB 0.02s 3.46s 4.80s &5MB 0.01s 4.81s
110 + 10 0.38s &7MB 5.15s &6MB 0.01s 5.16s 2.71s &8MB 0.00s 2.71s
120 + 10 0.42s &11MB 5.20s &15MB 0.01s 5.21s 2.79s &10MB 0.01s 2.80s
255 + 8 0.65s & 15MB 295.41s & 86MB 0.05s 295.46s 21.41s & 76MB 0.02s 21.43s
1009 + 10 1.49s &97MB 11504.2s & 117MB 2.46s 11506.66s 14.10s &471MB 1.74s 15.84s
1899 + 7 2.98s & 210MB 6538s & 171MB 4.09s 6542.09s 124.10s & 558MB 2.71s 173.71s
2059 + 8 3.82s &423MB 19525.1s &113MB 4.19s 19529.29s 20.70s &713MB error -
2099 + 8 4.05s & 32MB 19031s & 192MB 4.19s 19035.19s 124.12s & 757MB error -
2099 + 9 7.08s & 252MB 29742s & 198MB 4.28s 29746.28s 128.12s & 760MB error -
3060 + 9 11.36s & 282MB 29993.05s & 241MB 18.72s 30011.77s 261.07s & 610MB error -
3160 + 9 11.99s & 285MB 29252.05s & 257MB 26.15s 29278.2s 162.55s & 611MB error -
4058 + 7 18.06s & 332MB 81408.51s &307MB 92.68s 81501.19s 802.07s &1013MB error -
4058 + 8 19.42s & 397MB 82812.51s &399MB 91.91s 82904.42s 899.07s & 1020MB error -
4158 + 8 21.68s &491MB 83112.51s &401MB 97.68s 83210.19 899.19s &1021MB error -
5050 + 8 23.26s &499MB 93912.51s &298MB 118.12 94030.63s 205.12s &375MB error -
TABLE I: Our direct pre∗ algorithm vs. standard pre∗ algorithms of PDSs
|∆| + |∆c| SM-PDS PDS Result1 Total1 Symbolic PDS Result2 Total2
10 + 3 0.12s & 2MB 0.15s & 3MB 0.00s 0.15s 0.10s &2MB 0.00s 0.10s
13 + 3 0.12s & 2MB 0.15s &3MB 0.00s 0.15s 0.10s &2MB 0.00s 0.10s
43 + 7 0.28s & 2MB 3.44s & 4MB 0.04s 3.48s 4.80s & 5MB 0.02s 4.82s
110 + 10 0.36s & 8MB 5.15s &6MB 0.01s 5.16s 2.71s &8MB 0.00s 2.71s
120 + 10 0.39s & 13MB 5.20s &15MB 0.01s 5.21s 2.79s & 10MB 0.01s 2.80s
255 + 8 0.44s & 15MB 295.41s & 86MB 0.05s 295.46s 21.41s & 76MB 0.02s 21.43s
1009 + 10 1.48s & 97MB 11504.2s & 117MB 2.56s 11506.76s 14.10s & 471MB 1.75s 15.85s
1899 + 7 3.47s & 212MB 6538s & 171MB 3.89s 6541.89s 124.10s & 558MB 2.71s 126.81s
2059 + 8 4.03s &323MB 19525.1s & 113MB 3.99s 19528.99s 20.70s &713MB error -
2099 + 8 4.15s &332MB 19031s &192MB 3.99s 19034.99s 124.12s & 757MB error -
2099 + 9 4.95s & 352MB 29742s & 198MB 4.18s 29746.18s 128.12s & 760MB error -
3060 + 9 5.71s & 388MB 29993.05s & 241MB 18.12s 30011.17s 261.07s &610MB error -
3160 + 9 5.79s & 415MB 29252.05s & 257MB 26.10s 29278.15s 162.55s & 611MB error -
4058 + 7 7.56s & 364MB 81408.51s & 307MB 91.68s 81500.19s 802.07s & 1013MB error -
4058 + 8 9.76s & 387MB 82812.51s & 399MB 91.71s 82904.22s 899.07s & 1020MB error -
4158 + 8 11.85s & 487MB 83112.51s & 401MB 97.28s 83209.79s 899.19s & 1021MB error -
5050 + 8 13.04s & 498MB 93912.51s &498MB 112.53s 94025.04s 205.12s & 375MB error -
TABLE II: Our direct post∗ algorithm vs. standard post∗ algorithms of PDSs
symbolic PDSs is less efficient and leads to memory out in
several cases.
B. Malware Detection
Self-modifying code is widely used as an obfuscation tech-
nique for malware writers. Thus, we applied our tool for
malware detection.
Example SM-PDS PDS
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.b Y N
Backdoor.Win32.Allaple.b Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Avron.a Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Anar.a Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Anar.b Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.a Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.am Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.ao Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Bagle.ap Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Ardurk.d Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Atak.k Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Atak.g Y N
Email-Worm.Win32.Hanged Y N
TABLE III: Malware Detection
We consider self-modifying versions of 13 well known
malwares. In these versions, the malicious behaviors are
unreachable if one does not take into account that the self-
modifying piece of code will change the malware code: if
the code does not change, the part that contains the malicious
behavior cannot be reached; after executing the self-modifying
code, the control point will jump to the part containing the
malicious behavior.
We model such malwares in two ways: (1) first, we take into
account the self-modifying piece of code and use SM-PDSs
to represent these programs as discussed in Section III-B, (2)
second, we don’t take into account that this part of the code
is self-modifying and we treat it as all the other instructions
of the program. In this case, we model these programs by a
standard PDS following the translation of [ST12].
The results are reported in Table 3, Column Example
reports the name of the worm. Column SM-PDS shows
the result obtained by applying our method to check the
reachability of the entry point of the malicious block. Column
PDS gives the result if we apply the traditional PDS translation
of programs (without taking into account the semantics of self
modifying code) method to check the reachability of the entry
point of the malicious block. Y stands for yes (the program is
malicious) and N stands for no (the program is benign). As it
can be seen, our techniques that go through SM-PDS to model
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self modifying code is able to conclude that the entry point of
the malicious block is reachable, whereas the standard PDS
translation from programs fails to reach this conclusion.
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